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Abstract
This Article examines the way legal systems respond to social problems through a 
discursive analysis of a unique and timely issue: conscientious objection to military 
service based on political and ideological grounds. It explores how legal systems, 
conducting criminal justice procedures under conditions of warfare and dissent, attempt 
to maintain balance between addressing the extra-legal challenges presented to them 
through conscientious objection, and preserving the prevalence of legal inner logic, 
classification and interpretation.
As opposed to the jurisprudential and philosophical literature about conscientious 
objection, this Article approaches the issue through an empirical analysis of legal and 
judicial discourse in a particular case study. It follows the fascinating story of the left-
wing conscientious objection movement in Israel, following the escalation of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict beginning October 2000. It then examines the two cases that made it 
to Israeli military courts, analyzing the legal procedures and the verdict language, to learn 
how the legal system chose to construct its perception of the defendants, their actions, 
and the desired policy.
As the Article claims, while the court seeks to eventually preserve the ethos of military 
service and to discourage ideological dissent, it also strives to maintain legitimacy for its 
decisions under heavy media coverage, civilian scrutiny and political unrest. Therefore, it 
allows the objectors to bring up extra-legal, political, biographical and philosophical 
issues, and awards them exceeding procedural flexibility. The eventual verdicts, however, 
reflect the doctrinal-legal tendency to reduce complex personalities and situations into 
monolithic, mutually-exclusive categories, to facilitate a workable classification of the 
offenders for normative purposes. 
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Introduction: How Law Thinks About Conscientious Objection
Political dissent to military service in controversial circumstances, and the way legal 
systems address it, is a timely and controversial subject linked with several current 
international conflicts. Recently, CBS News reported of 5,000 deserters from the 
American forces in Iraq who provide conscientious reasons for their resistance.1
Thousands of miles away, the ever-changing realities of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
most recently in the escalation of the conflict since October of 2000,2 give rise to political 
activism and dissent which are partly manifested as movements for conscientious 
objection to military service.3
Both of these legal systems, as well as many other legal systems in different times and 
places,4 face unique challenges when presented with offenders with political and 
ideological motives, particularly in times of war, which invariably raise moral and 
1 Deserters: We Won’t Go to Iraq, CBS NEWS, December 9, 2004. For other examples of secular, 
politically-motivated resistance in the American army in recent conflicts, see CHARLES C. MOSKOS AND
JOHN WHITECLAY CHAMBERS, THE NEW CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION: FROM SACRED TO SECULAR 
RESISTANCE (1993).
2 The most recent of these developments is the Israeli governmental decision to separate from the occupied 
territories, a move which will include the evacuation of Jewish settlements: Herb Keinon, Sharon, Mofaz 
Sign Evacuation Orders, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 20, 2005, 1.
3 During the escalation of the conflict, conscientious objection was an exclusively left-wing phenomenon, 
stemming from objection to serve in the territories and collaborate with the occupation: Sarah Leibovitz-
Dar, The New Frontier of Objection, HA’ARETZ, Dec. 8, 2000. The recent changes in political situation, 
described in supra note 2, albeit supported by many Israelis and Palestinians alike, are giving rise to similar 
initiatives from religious right-wing soldiers, who object to the evacuation of Biblical Israeli territory: 
Israeli Soldiers May Refuse Orders, CBS NEWS, January 3, 2005. Since the latter movement has only just 
emerged, and has not been yet put to the test of reality and law, this Article analyzes the legal policy toward 
the former movement. 
4 C. Eg. KEITH L. SPRUNGER, VOICES AGAINST WAR: A GUIDE TO THE SCHOWALTER ORAL HISTORY 
COLLECTION ON WORLD WAR I CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION (1981); SUE KINCHY, PROFILES IN CONSCIENCE: 
200 YEARS OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN THE ARMED FORCES (1973).
humanitarian dilemmas of warfare ethics, as well as a sense of patriotism and concern for 
national safety.5 The legal system may feel the need to uphold laws of compulsory draft, 
whether permanent or ad hoc,6 in order to maintain order and cohesion, if not consensus, 
in times of unrest; at the same time, it needs to maintain respect, and an open ear, to the 
moral dilemmas, whether objective or subjective, faced by those whom it judges.
This Article offers a way to understand how legal systems think about conscientious 
objection from a fresh and unusual perspective. Rather than suggesting philosophical and 
jurisprudential guidelines for legal policy,7 the Article uses a case study – the Israeli 
military legal system’s response to the conscientious objection wave following the Al 
Aksa Intifada of 2000 - to enter a legal system’s collective mind and examine how it 
perceives and addresses the phenomenon of conscientious objection; how much of these 
perceptions are shaped by the political and ideological issues driving the objectors; and 
how much of them are shaped by law’s inner logic and knowledge-production 
mechanisms. As the case study shows, the legal system is not insensitive to the extra-
legal dimensions of the conscientious objection problem, and it allows the objectors 
significant procedural flexibility, as well as a substantive “voice”, in the process; 
however, for the purpose of justifying its decisions in conscientious objection cases, the 
5
 Moral dilemmas are particularly evident in conflicts that require military personnel to confront civilian 
populations: COLM MCKEOGH, INNOCENT CIVILIANS: THE MORALITY OF KILLING IN WAR (2002); 
MICHAEL WALZER, ARGUING ABOUT WAR (2004). 
6
 In Israel, military service has been a general duty since the State’s inauguration in 1948: SECURITY 
SERVICE ACT, 1982. In the United States, general draft policies shifted across time: JAMES M. GERHARDT, 
THE DRAFT AND PUBLIC POLICY; ISSUES IN MILITARY MANPOWER PROCUREMENT, 1945-1970 (1971).
7
 Such discussions constitute the backbone of the rich tradition of literature on the subject: C. Eg. CARL 
COHEN, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: CONSCIENCE, TACTICS AND THE LAW (1971); Carl Cohen, Conscientious 
Objection, 4 ETHICS 269(1968); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1999), Michael Walzer, The 
Obligation to Disobey, 77(3) ETHICS 163 (1967). 
system reduces and simplifies the offenders and their actions into monolithic, mutually 
exclusive categories, which allow it to apply workable classifications and interpretations 
using formal legal logic. The Article claims that this duality of flexibility and adherence 
to legal thought patterns allows the system to reach a politically desirable outcome –
convicting and punishing the offenders – while awarding it external legitimacy stemming 
from its fairness and objectivity.  
The analytical framework informing the Article’s quest into the legal system’s mind is 
Foucault’s governmentality theory.8 While this framework is applicable to a variety of
settings involving policy and knowledge, it is used in this Article to analyze the particular 
case of criminal justice policy.
Governmentality focuses, analytically and methodologically, on the connection between 
power, exercised at various levels – from state power to power over the self – and 
knowledge.9 Foucault observes an interplay between -
 a ‘code’ which rules ways of doing things… and a production of true discourses 
which serve to found, justify and provide reasons and principles for these ways of 
doing things. To put the matter clearly: my problem is to see how men govern 
(themselves and others) by the production of truth.10
8
 Space precludes a full explanation of Foucault’s theory; I therefore present a few of its aspects which are 
most pertinent for the framework of this paper.
9
 The framework was developed by Foucault in his lectures at the College de France: Michel Foucault, 
Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY (GRAHAM BURCHELL, COLIN 
GORDON, AND PETER MILLER, EDS.) (1991), and, less explicitly, in other works: MICHEL FOUCAULT, 
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (1979); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF 
SEXUALITY, VOLUME I: AN INTRODUCTION (1977). However, Foucault’s notion of “law” was rather 
narrow; governmentality developed to encompass the modern concept of law, using Weberian ideas of 
legal rationality, in later projects drawing on his work: BURCHELL ET AL, ibid; ALAN HUNT AND GARY 
WICKHAM, FOUCAULT AND LAW: TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF LAW AS GOVERNANCE (1994); NIKOLAS 
ROSE, POWERS OF FREEDOM: REFRAMING POLITICAL THOUGHT (1999). For an analysis comparing 
Foucauldian theory to other discursive frameworks, see NIELS AKERSTROM ANDERSEN, DISCURSIVE 
ANALYTICAL STRATEGIES: UNDERSTANDING FOUCAULT, KOSELLECK, LACLAU, LUHMANN (2003). 
10
 Foucault , ibid., 90.
The emergence of this “code” and the production of a “truth” which informs and supports 
it is studied through different events, approaches and practices, emerging in different 
social locations and fields, to establish the “conditions of possibility”11 which constitute 
ground for the emergence of ideas and policies. Rather than searching for deep structural 
motivations for policy, governmentality attends to “superficiality, an empiricism of the 
surface, of identifying the differences in what is said, how it is said, and what allows it to 
be said and to have an effectivity”.12 Governmentality is not interested primarily in 
demonstrating the ideological distortions in official “truth”, but in documenting how the 
investment of power in forms of truth transforms the way subjects and social institutions 
become problems for government. Governmentality-influenced questions about a given 
legal policy would be: how does the policy, initiative or program, perceive the problem 
and the subjects involved in it? What realms of knowledge influence this perception? 
Which forms of knowledge and expertise allows for the problematization (or, in our case,
criminalization) of particular kinds of individual behaviors, or the adoption of a new 
strategy or policy regarding a certain issue at a certain time and place? What techniques 
and strategies are promoted as solutions for the problem?
While several works advocate the applicability of governmentality theory to the analysis 
of legal systems,13 none have incorporated it in empirical studies of legal cases, though a 
very similar, and parallel, enterprise was undertaken by Professor Jonathan Simon in his 
11 ROSE, supra note 9, 57.
12 Id.
13 BURCHELL ET AL, supra note 9; HUNT AND WICKHAM, supra note 9.
masterful analysis of the Warren Commission.14 Analyzing the Commission’s report of 
President Kennedy’s murder by Lee Harvey Oswald, Professor Simon highlights the 
important discursive role of the Comission’s report:  “to fill the empty space . . . with a 
believable explanation; . . . to make sense of what happened”.15 This role is even more 
important in criminal cases, where what is said in court and written in the verdict needs to 
constitute a plausible justification for conviction and punishment (or for acquittal). 
What is unique about legal cases and judicial decisions is that the justification provided 
for the outcome of the case must be a legal justification. Criminal justice procedures, 
decisions, verdicts and sentences are based on legal logic, which consists of identifying 
the appropriate rule for the specific situation presented to the court and correctly applying 
it to reach the normative outcome.16 This system of logic is self referential: verdicts 
showing how these rules are applied constitute, in themselves, instructions for the usage 
of rules on other situations in the future.17 The process of applying legal principles to 
specific situations builds on a classification of the specific case at hand into legally-
14
 Jonathan Simon, Ghosts of the Disciplinary Machine: Lee Harvey Oswald, Life-History, and the Truth of 
Crime, 10 YALE JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE HUMANITIES 75 (1998).
15
 Ibid., 77.
16 Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE 
CRITIQUE (DAVID KAIRYS, ED.) 54 (1998); WILLIAM TWINING AND DAVID MIERS, HOW TO DO THINGS 
WITH RULES: A PRIMER OF INTERPRETATION (1999); KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, THINKING LIKE A 
LAWYER: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1996). The American legal system relies on jury 
decisions to establish guilt or innocence, limiting judicial reasoning to decisions in appellate instances; 
however, in non-jury legal systems, such as the Israeli system, criminal verdicts include not only a 
statement as to the outcome of the trial, but also a justification for reaching said outcome. In the military 
justice system, described in this article, the obligation to provide reasonings for verdicts can be found in 
article 440(9) of the MILITARY JUSTICE ACT, 1955.
17
 This is the idea behind the doctrine of stare decisis. Some theoreticians, primarily Dworkin, see this 
doctrine as a manifestation of the constant legal enterprise of interpretation: RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S 
EMPIRE (1988). Scholarship in the tradition of systems theory refer to this self referential quality of law as 
“legal autopoiesis”: NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM (2004); Gunther Teubner, How the Law 
Thinks: Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law, 23(5) LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW 727 (1989).
prescribed, mutually-exclusive categories, which prescribe a normative outcome 
according to the category where the case belongs.18
However, case hearings and verdicts have additional audiences and purposes: they are 
read by the parties, appellate judges, academics, the media, and have to convince these 
external institutions of their validity and coherence.19 A convicting verdict needs to 
narrate the events in a manner which explains why the defendant’s action constitutes a 
violation of a legal duty; it is followed by a sentence, which needs to explicate the 
circumstances in a manner that justifies the amount and type of punishment inflicted 
upon the defendant. Both parts of the decision need to show that the decision was reached 
in a way which does not violate the principles that provide legal systems with their 
legitimacy; their claim of objectivity, logic and impartial implementation of universal 
principles.20
This Article examines the way legal systems shape their processes and decisions to fulfill 
these complex roles through an analysis of the two conscientious objector cases which 
reached the Israeli military court in the summer of 2003. The cases are presented through 
a variety of military and journalistic sources, as well as through interviews with the legal 
policymakers and representatives of the army and the defendant, and through extensive 
courtroom observations carried between June and October of 2003. 
18 TWINING, supra note 16; VANDEVELDE, supra note 16; MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (1954); 
MAX WEBER, CHARISMA AND INSTITUTION BUILDING: SELECTED PAPERS (1968). 
19
 This is necessary for obtaining legitimacy for the exercise of judicial power: Douglas Hay, Property, 
Authority and the Criminal law, in ALBION’S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
ENGLAND (DOUGLAS HAY, ED.) (1975) 
20 MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1981).
Part I of the Article provides an introductory overview to the phenomenon of 
conscientious objection to serve in the Israeli army, placing the problem in context of 
political philosophy, Israeli reality and military law, and presenting the “conditions of 
possibility” for the legal policy toward deserters. By showing the philosophical and 
cultural sources for the legal system’s perception of conscientious objection, this part 
provides a “genealogy” of ideas, and explains how the system obtains and constructs its 
knowledge of the problem.
In Part II, the Article tells the story of the two conscientious objector trials; it describes 
the political background for their emergence, as well as the legal hearings themselves, 
emphasizing the manners by which the objectors presented themselves and their 
ideologies and the ways in which these presentations were perceived and addressed by 
the system during the trials. The narratives of both cases show the court’s willingness to 
discuss extra-legal issues, such as the offenders’ personal biographies and the etiology of 
their political views, as well as the flexibility it exhibited in shaping the procedural 
aspects of the trial; this openness and flexibility, the Article argues, provided the court 
with legitimacy for its decisions.   
The court’s decisions in the two cases are analyzed in Part III, which shows, through a 
content analysis of the verdicts and sentences, how the court chose to define the problem 
and regard the defendants. This chapter examines the court’s usage of legal and extra-
legal sources of knowledge about the problem and the goals it sought to achieve using 
these sources and perceptions.  
Finally, the conclusion places the analysis in context of the discursive theoretical 
framework, shows the way the verdict shapes and constructs knowledge about 
conscientious objection, and offers an explanation of how the verdicts reflect both the 
court’s and the objectors’ interests.
I. Conscientious Objection in Israel: Theory, Politics, and Legal Doctrine
A. What Is Conscientious Objection? Philosophical Definitions and Moral Dilemmas
A rich literary tradition, both in Anglo-American21 and Israeli22 literature, addresses the 
phenomena of conscientious objection, focusing mainly on political and philosophical 
aspects of the problem, such as the duty to obey the law and the right to disobey it based 
on conscientious motives. While much of this discussion exceeds the framework of this 
Article, it is important to point out two concepts from this literature: conscientious 
objection and civil disobedience. The two concepts provide a philosophical framework 
for a situation where a person feels unable to follow the law because it conflicts with his 
or her ethics. Some well known examples for such conflicts may be a reluctance to pay 
21
 For a few notable examples see Cohen, COHEN, RAWLS, and Walzer, supra note 7.
22 C. Eg. David Enoch, Some Arguments against Conscientious Objection and Civil Disobedience Refuted, 
36(3) ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 227 (2004); Chaim Gans, The Concept of a Duty to Obey the Law, 17(3) 
MISHPATIM  507 (1987); Chaim Gans, Right and Left: Ideological Disobedience in Israel, 36(3) ISRAEL 
LAW REVIEW 1(2004); Alon Harel, Unconscionable Objection to Conscientious Objection: Notes on Sagi 
and Shapira, 36(3) ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 219 (2004); Barak Medina, Political Disobedience in the IDF: 
The Scope of the Legal Right of Soldiers to Be Excused from Taking Part in Military Activities in the 
Occupied Territories, 36(3) ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 73 (2004); Amir Paz-Fuchs and Michael Sfard, The 
Fallacies of Objections to Selective Conscientious Objection, 36(3) ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 111 (2004); Avi 
Sagi and Ron Shapira, Civil Disobedience and Conscientious Objection, 36(3) ISRAEL LAW REVIEW
181(2004). 
taxes which finance a regime of slavery or racism, or engagement in nonviolent political 
activity against such a regime.23
The definitions of conscientious objection and civil disobedience slightly differ among 
thinkers, but for the purposes of this project we may adhere to the definition given by 
Rawls. 24 Rawls sees the two concepts as exceptions to the prima facie duty to obey the 
law. He refers to civil disobedience as “a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political 
act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or 
policies of the government”.25 Rawls states that conscientious objection might somewhat 
overlap a broad interpretation of civil disobedience;26 conscientious objection does not 
require appealing to the sense of justice of the majority, and does not seek common 
ground, but entails the premise that one’s personal conscience – not necessarily political 
– is at odds with the constitutional order. The two categories are therefore different, but 
not mutually exclusive.
B. The Compulsory and Egalitarian Military Service Ethos: National Heritage, 
Consensus and Dissent 
Addressing the possibility of conscientious objection as an exception to the prima facie 
duty to obey the law was a particularly problematic issue in the Israeli army. Since the 
23 HENRY DAVID THOREAU, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND OTHER ESSAYS (1993); Martin Luther King, Letter 
from Birmingham Jail (1963)
24 RAWLS, Supra note 7, 363.
25
 Id.
26
 Id. 
inauguration of the Israeli state, military service has been a national duty,27 as well as a 
seminal social institution,28 supported by a captivating ethos of compulsory and 
egalitarian service. 
This ethos owes its creation to the Israeli formative national heritage, and particularly to 
the trauma and lessons of the Holocaust. In the new State, formed as a solution to the 
problem of anti-Semitism and Jewish persecution, “new Jews” - strong, proactive, rooted 
to the land – will defend themselves. The necessity of a formidable Israeli defense shaped 
the army’s image as an essential institution,29 constructing objection to serve as 
dangerous and unpatriotic.30
Simultaneously, the lessons of the Second World War and the Holocaust highlighted the 
importance of the Israeli army’s moral worth. The army was presented as following 
27 SECURITY SERVICE ACT, 1982. The national service duty includes a period of regular service 
(approximately three years for men and two for women), followed by a lifetime of yearly reserve service 
determined by one’s gender and military specialization. Some groups are, however, exempted from military 
service, such as Ultra-Orthodox Jews, Orthodox women and Israeli Arab citizens: Avishai Margalit and 
Moshe Halbertal, Liberalism and the Right to Culture, in MULTICULTURALISM IN A DEMOCRATIC AND 
JEWISH STATE (MENACHEM MAUNTER, AVI SAGI AND RONEN SHAMIR, EDS.) (1998). 
28
 This role is mostly constructed around the army’s perception as “melting pot” of the Israeli multi-cultural 
society: YAGIL LEVY, THE OTHER ARMY OF ISRAEL: MATERIALIST MILITARISM IN ISRAEL (2003). Official 
narratives still refer to the army under the social slogan of  “army of the people”: see the IDF official 
webpate: http://www.idf.il, last visited Dec. 7th, 2004. The army is also credited for generating social status 
and material advantages: BARUCH KIMMERLING, THE INVENTION AND DECLINE OF ISRAELINESS: STATE, 
SOCIETY AND THE MILITARY (2001). Many Israeli politicians often invoke their military backgrounds: 
IMMANUEL VALD, THE GORDIC KNOT: MYTHS AND DILEMMAS OF NATIONAL SECURITY (1992); even 
dissenting groups expressing political opinions often lean on military experience and expertise as providing 
them with the “right”, or the legitimacy, to speak of political matters (For an ironic and extreme example, 
see the extensive use of ranks and military experience in the conscientious objectors’ website: 
http://www.seruv.org.il, accessed March 2nd, 2005).
29
 Even the army’s name – the Israel Defense Forces – communicates this message.
30
 Menachem Finkelstein, Refusal to Serve in the Territories: Decision of the Military Advocate General, 
16 ARMY AND LAW 713 (2002). 
ethical and humane guidelines,31 engaging only in “no-choice wars”,32 and maintaining a 
clear distinction between permissible and impermissible acts of war (such as attacking 
civilians), through the concept of “cleanliness of arms”.33 Claims to the contrary, 
emerging in the Lebanon war and the first Intifada, are therefore presented as unfounded, 
and objecting to serve based on supposedly unethical military practices are discounted.34
Finally, being the army of an immigration country,35 great importance was ascribed to 
egalitarian military service as a mechanism for social coherence and the establishments of 
shared ideals.36 As a “melting-pot” of Israeli society, the army must maintain Social 
strength and a country of immigrants – melting pot – everyone serves together – the army 
as a mutual and unifying institution. Dissent from this ideal, particularly based on 
political claims which might cause ideological and social rifts in the army, are therefore 
seen as a threat. 
In light of these narratives as “conditions of possibility”,37 it is not surprising that the 
Israeli legal policy limits the extent of its recognition of conscientious objection. In an 
essential, defensive, ethical and culturally unifying institution, as the army was 
constructed, ideological objection to serve is perceived as politically dangerous, ethically 
31
 In the early 1990s, these were formulated as the IDF’s ethical code: ASA KASHER, MILITARY ETHICS
(1996). 
32
 This overarching narrative is discussed and criticized in recent historical accounts of Israeli wars, 
proposing instead that the history of armed conflict is a “history of alternatives”: Ilan Pappe, The New 
History of the 1948 War, 3 THEORY AND CRITIQUE 99. 
33 KASHER, supra note 35. The concept of “cleanliness of arms” and the ethical solution of moral dilemmas 
is thoroughly discussed in Israeli literature: S. YIZHAR, HIRBET HIZ’AA; THE CAPTIVE (1949). 
34
 For an overview of this position see Gans, supra note 19. 
35
 Israel, designed to be a national home for Jews from all countries, provides citizenship to all immigrating 
Jews: The LAW OF RETURN, 1950.   
36 KIMMERLING, supra note 23.
37
 See supra note 11 and the accompanying text.
unsound and socially irresponsible. The rule for exemption does, however, allow for 
possible exceptions and is based on a distinction between pacifists and politically-
motivated objections. Whereas declared, coherent and genuine pacifists – who object to 
participate in all warfare - are released from service, people objecting to selective wars or 
tasks – a euphemism for politically-motivated objections - are not. Consequently, their 
objection is considered a Refusal to Obey Orders, an offense under article 122 of the 
Military Justice Act of 1955.38 According to article 122, soldiers must obey all orders 
(interpreted to include, first and foremost, the initial order to enlist when called for) 
unless, as article 124 states, “it is clear and obvious that the order given to (them) was 
illegal”.39
The army and its legal system had to address conscientious objection, based on pacifism 
as well as political reasons, ever since the 1950s, and objection to the occupation of the 
territories began as early as the 1970s.40 However, the first organized group of objectors 
emerged during the 1982 war in Lebanon, as part of the left wing “Yesh Gvul” 
movement. “Yesh Gvul”, whose name means “there is a limit” in Hebrew, advocated 
“selective” refusal according to the third distinction mentioned above: the objectors 
refused to serve in Lebanon or in Lebanon-related activities.41 The concept of selective 
refusal was later adopted in the 1988 Intifada to service in the territories, through some of 
38 Gans, supra note 22; LEON SHELEFF, THE VOICE OF HONOR – CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION OUT OF CIVIC 
LOYALTY (1987). 
39 In fact, a soldier obeying a “clearly and obviously” illegal command could be prosecuted for 
participating in an illegal act; a “clearly and obviously” illegal command was defined, in the infamous Kfar 
Kasem massacre case of 1956, as a command “bearing a black flag” of illegality: “not formal, hidden or 
half hidden illegality… an illegality that stings the eye and enrages the heart, if the eye is not blind and the 
heart is not obtuse or corrupted”: Center 3/57, The Military Prosecutor v Malinki et al. 
40
 Gans, supra note 38; PERETZ KIDRON, REFUSENIK! ISRAEL’S SOLDIERS OF CONSCIENCE (2004); RUTH 
LINN, CONSCIENCE AT WAR: THE ISRAELI SOLDIER AS A MORAL CRITIC (1996). 
41 KIDRON, ibid; LINN, Ibid.
the objectors refused to serve in the army altogether during this time. The Intifada refusal 
movement led to an increase in the size of overt objection.42
The objection to the two wars had a common rationale. The Israeli army had always 
declared itself a defensive, protective force, rather than an aggressor; hence its name, 
“Israel Defense Force”. The warfare ethos upon which generations of Jewish Israelis had 
been raised was based on the premise that all Arab-Israeli wars had been “wars of no 
choice”.43 The Lebanon war, taking place on foreign soil, and the Intifada encounters 
with enraged civilian population under occupation, defied these traditional boundaries, 
and therefore created a “limit”, a boundary, for the objectors. In addition, several Intifada 
objectors invoked the legal defense for disobeying “clearly and obviously illegal 
commands”, claiming that participating in the occupation fit into this category. 
C. A Socio-Demographic Profile of the Conscientious Objection Movement
Although the different waves of objectors varied somewhat over time, they shared several 
political and socio-demographic characteristics. Ideologically, while some individuals 
were exempted from service based on their pacifist beliefs, the critical mass of organized 
conscientious objection has been identified with the left-wing end of the Israeli political 
map.44 The involvement of conscientious objectors in political activism increased over 
42
 Ruth Linn, When the Individual Soldier Says ‘No’ to War: A Look at Selective Refusal During the 
Intifada, 33(4) JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH 14 (1996). 
43
 This premise is challenged in recent years, and many wars presented earlier as “wars of no choice” are 
now said by some scholars to represent a “history of alternatives”, in which Israel had engaged in an 
aggressive role by choice: LEVY, supra note 28; Pappe, supra note 32. 
44
 Gans, supra note 22. This trait, however, may change in light of the recent political development: see 
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time; whereas the 1982 objectors to the war in Lebanon engaged in demonstrations 
against the war, the 1988 objectors to service in the occupied territories were more 
immersed in politically-oriented activities. The Intifada objectors, who had already 
enjoyed the infrastructure of the Lebanon anti-war movement, were more organized, and 
involved in political activism in their civilian lives.45  The new wave of objectors, 
brought about by the 2000 Al-Aksa Intifada, also supported left -wing views; however, in 
their official petitions published in Israeli periodicals46 they also emphasized their 
identifies an combat officers and soldiers, probably to gain legitimacy in the eyes of more 
militant, less left-wing groups in Israeli society.47 This is evident from their usage of 
military uniforms and ranks in the textual and graphic content of their website, as well as 
from the petition itself:
• We, reserve combat officers and soldiers of the Israel Defense Forces, who 
were raised upon the principles of Zionism, sacrifice and giving to the people of 
Israel and to the State of Israel, who have always served in the front lines, and 
who were the first to carry out any mission, light or heavy, in order to protect the 
State of Israel and strengthen it. 
• We, combat officers and soldiers who have served the State of Israel for long 
weeks every year, in spite of the dear cost to our personal lives, have been on 
reserve duty all over the Occupied Territories, and were issued commands and 
directives that had nothing to do with the security of our country, and that had the 
sole purpose of perpetuating our control over the Palestinian people. We, whose 
eyes have seen the bloody toll this Occupation exacts from both sides. 
• We, who sensed how the commands issued to us in the Territories, destroy all the 
values we had absorbed while growing up in this country. 
• We, who understand now that the price of Occupation is the loss of IDF?s human 
character and the corruption of the entire Israeli society. 
• We, who know that the Territories are not Israel, and that all settlements are 
bound to be evacuated in the end. 
• We hereby declare that we shall not continue to fight this War of the Settlements. 
• We shall not continue to fight beyond the 1967 borders in order to dominate, 
expel, starve and humiliate an entire people. 
45 LINN, supra note 41; Linn, supra note 42. 
46 Petition, HA’ARETZ, December 1, 2002.
47
 Aviv Lavi, We Have Sobered Up, HA’ARETZ, Dec. 27, 2002. 
• We hereby declare that we shall continue serving in the Israel Defense Forces in 
any mission that serves Israel’s defense. 
• The missions of occupation and oppression do not serve this purpose - and 
we shall take no part in them.48
Although the conscientious objection movement is motivated by, and ostensibly 
organized around, political views, some suggest that the bond between members consist 
as much of social milieu as of ideology.49 Conscientious objectors from the 1982 
Lebanon war and the 1988 Intifada have been identified as being primarily middle-class 
and of Western (Ashkenazi) ethnicity.50 In some of the literature, the objectors 
themselves prefer to present themselves as more diverse in terms of social background;51
however, in other studies their self-descriptions reveal their more affluent backgrounds 
and connection with Israeli academia. In a study examining the prison experiences of 
reservists who were punished for conscientious objection to serve in the territories, one of 
the interviewees provided the following profile of a typical objector:
[H]igh or middle class, Ashkenazi, free occupations, a higher percentage of 
academic background. The majority from the center of the country, the center in Tel 
Aviv University, high percentage of social sciences, doctoral students, I know the 
ones that are active in the movement, but wouldn’t be surprised if this is the general 
profile.52
48 http://www.seruv.org.il/, accessed March 1, 2005; bold lettering in original text.
49 LEVY, supra note 28. Levy connects between the social characteristics pointing to the demilitarization of 
the elites, comprised of secular males of European (“Ashkenazi”) ethnicity; according to his analysis, since 
the Yom Kippur war of 1973, the social capital stemming from military and combat service has gradually 
eroded, leading the elites to gain prestige through alternative vehicles such as technology, and leaving 
military service as an arena for the social mobilization of less advantaged groups, such as orthodox Jews, 
women, and people of Middle-Eastern and North-African (“Mizrachi”) ethnicity.  
50
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In a collection of interviews focusing on the conscientious objectors’ political 
perspectives,53 most interviewees describe their socio-economic status as “affluent” or 
“middle-class”. Only one of the interviewees is an Jew of Eastern ethnicity; the others 
claim that they had not been “privileged” in any special way because of their identity as 
Westerners. Several of them correlate their acts with social, as well as political, agendas; 
and one introspective objector observes that the movement was comprised of intellectual-
elitists because people who grew up with a sense of entitlement from the consensus 
would feel more comfortable breaking from it. Even the Eastern-identified interviewee 
states that his identity was not shaped to a great extent by his ethnicity, which he now 
claims to regret. The younger objectors describe politically active families, often 
comprised of members of the Israeli intellectual elite.
In summary, the conscientious objectors appear to enjoy a variety of social resources, 
stemming from both their strong political conviction (and, subsequently, strong 
organization and mutual support) and social status (reflected by their confidence, 
eloquence, and strong support from capable families). The following subParts illustrate 
how influential this ideological and demographic background was in their encounters 
with the law.
D. The Legal Policy Concerning Conscientious Objection
This rule according to which pacifism merits an exemption from military service, while 
politically-related refusal to serve constitutes a criminal offense was rather complex to 
53 RONIT CHACHAM, BREAKING RANKS: REFUSING TO SERVE IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP (2004). 
uphold in the 1982 and 1988 waves of conscientious objection. Many commanders 
were open to informal negotiations of alternative service with their refusing soldiers, or 
turned a blind eye to reserve solders who left the army based on medical, or mental 
health, reasons, or moved abroad. Others treated their soldiers more harshly, sent to 
prison and expelled from their units.54
This informal treatment became somewhat more formalized in 1995, when the Chief of 
Personnel formed a special committee (known by the soldiers as the “conscience 
committee”). The actual circumstances behind forming the committee are unclear. 
Military prosecutors claim that it was an institutional move to organize better the policy 
for exempting personnel based on conscience and ideology. However, defense 
attorneys, as well as critical literature, allege that the committee might have been 
formed to anticipate a potential wave of refusals from religious right-wing soldiers in 
the event of settlement evacuation.55
The committee’s formation was not publicly announced, nor has its function been 
regulated in any act of legislation or paperwork.56 The unwritten guidelines for the 
committee’s function maintain the status quo preceding its existence: pacifists –
defined for legal purposes as people who object to any type of service in any type of 
armed force – were exempted, whereas “selective objectors” – those who rule out 
54 LINN, supra note 40. 
55
 Based on interviews with military prosecutors and defense attorneys; I could not locate any military or 
civilian documentation explaining the birth of the conscience committee. Also see LEVY, supra note 28.
56
 The information about the committee’s members and informal guidelines, therefore, is obtained from the 
Ben Artzi petition to the High Court of Justice: HC 1380/02 Ben Artzi v. the Minister of Security, PD 56(4), 
76.(henceforth referred to as the Ben Artzi Petition), as well as from newspaper reports: Tal Hassin, A 
Trojan Horse in the Conscience Committee, HA’ARETZ, July 18, 2003. 
participation in an armed conflict only in certain circumstances - were not.57 The 
committee did not have authority to make final decisions, but only to recommend an 
outcome to the Chief of Personnel Unit. However, the committee’s recommendations 
were invariably affirmed by the official decision. 
The committee is chaired by an officer from the Personnel unit and includes a legal 
representative from the Military Attorney General Unit (the Consultation and 
Legislation branch, which deals with civilian affairs), as well as members of regulation 
and behavioral science units. Until the High Court of Justice recommendation that a 
civilian be appointed to the committee, made in the Ben Artzi petition;58 it was 
comprised exclusively of military members. Until the High Court of Justice 
recommendation to include a civilian member, the committee was comprised only of 
military members. Following the petition, the army began appointing a civilian member 
to the committee. This member is invariably a volunteering philosophy professor – a 
choice which reveals the army’s conformity to the dominant discourse on conscientious 
objection, and yet a peculiar one considering the self-described objective of the 
committee - a tool for finding out whether the applicants in question are honest in their 
claims of pacifism.59
Throughout its existence between 1995 and 2003, the committee heard 301 petitions for 
exemption from service, rejecting 245 (81%) of them, and exempting from service only 
57
 Ben Artzi petition, supra note 56.; Hassin, ibid.
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 Ben Artzi petition, id.
59
 This purpose was described by the committee chair in Ben Artzi’s military trial: Headquarters 129/03 
(henceforth: the Ben Artzi case/verdict/sentence). Also see: Hassin, supra note 56.
24 (8%). In the remaining 32 cases (11%) the committee recommended “eased service 
conditions”.60 According to the prosecutor, this last option is a bona fides military 
attempt to accommodate the needs of soldiers who do not have a problem belonging to 
an armed force, but express other personal limitations, such as a reluctance to bear arms 
themselves.61 Among the options offered to this group is, for example, the possibility to 
serve in a civilian hospital. 
The applicants are allowed legal representation, and may bring with them any written 
material they choose, as well as two witnesses, to support their claim of genuine 
pacifism. The attorney, however, is only allowed in the room before and after the actual 
process: the applicant is interviewed alone by the committee, and so are the witnesses.62
Any attempt to officially regulate military policy regarding conscientious objection 
beyond the establishment of the committee has been, so far, in vain. Several legislation 
initiatives sought to legalize conscientious objection by allowing for any person 
claiming conscientious reasons to be exempted from service. All initiatives, the last of 
which was made in 1999, failed; the initiatives were strongly opposed by the 
government and by the army. The Military Attorney General’s unit reasoned that 
allowing a general exemption would practically make military service non-compulsory, 
and was therefore categorically rejected.63
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E. The Al Aksa Intifada and the New Wave of Left-Wing Objection 
This was how matters stood when the Israeli-Palestinian conflict escalated into a 
second Intifada in October 2000. The reoccupation of Gaza and the West Bank in 
200264 brought about a “new objection frontier” of reservist soldiers, called The 
Courage to Refuse movement.65 Beginning December 2002, the movement published a
petition declaring the members’ intention not to perform reserve service in the occupied 
territories.66 Throughout the subsequent months, which involved an escalation of the 
conflict in the territories, many of the objectors who had signed the petition were called 
for service, refused to attend, and were subsequently tried in disciplinary hearings and 
sent to short imprisonment sentences. The reservist objectors’ attempt to contest their 
disciplinary conviction and request a formal criminal trial in court failed; the Military 
Advocate General refused to grant them a trial, repeating the policy according to which 
politically-motivated objectors are not exempted from service, and stating that the 
army’s activities in the territories were legal.67 His decision was affirmed by the High 
Court of Justice.68 Subsequently, about 250 out of the 635 soldiers who signed the 
petition were tried in disciplinary hearings and served short imprisonment terms in 
military facilities.69 None of these reservist cases ever reached the military courts. 
64 BBC News, April 4, 2002.
65
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The reservist movement was soon supplemented by a movement of potential regular-
service soldiers. During the summer of 2002, about 300 draft- age high-school students 
signed letters addressed to the IDF Chief of Staff, protesting the occupation and 
declaring their intention to object to service.70 As opposed to the reservists who had 
only refused to serve in the occupied territories, this younger group refused to serve 
anywhere in the IDF, explaining that every role or position in the army would be 
assisting, directly or indirectly, the occupation. Some of them stated their refusal upon 
their arrival to the drafting office on their conscription day; others sent letters 
beforehand. The army screened the different petitioners based on their own 
declarations. Only those whose motives seemed ambiguous, and might have constituted 
pacifism, were summoned to the conscience committee; those who expressed clear 
political motives, were not summoned for a hearing.71
Military personnel documents obtained from the prosecutor show that the army was 
closely following each and every case of objection. A special personnel document72
contains a list of objectors and their military data (medical and psychometric exam 
results), and refers to the proceedings in committees and disciplinary hearings in their 
matters. In several cases, the objectors were awarded exemptions from service for 
reasons related to narcotics and other personal issues, which were “neutral”, non-
conscientious grounds. A few people are listed as “agreed to serve” (the circumstances 
are not noted) and some of them are “scheduled for a meeting with parent” and military 
70
 Some of these groups were related to the youth groups of the “New Profile” movement, an organization 
aimed at demilitarizing Israeli society: http://www.newprofile.org (accessed Dec. 9, 2004).
71
 This process is described in Headquarters 151, 174, 205, 222, 243/03 Military Prosecutor v. Matar et al. 
(henceforth referred to as “’The Five’ case”).
72
 Military Personnel Unit, Report on Draft Refusers – Conscience (IDF, 2003).
officials. This systematic monitoring of individuals reflects the military regard of each 
of the 300 or so high-school students as an individual challenge.
The personal attention to each of the objectors was also evident in the way the army 
initially dealt with them, which reflects the army’s commitment to the ethos by which 
“everyone can serve”. In the height of the refusal movement, the army was prepared to 
offer service options to match the soldiers’ needs (like the abovementioned “eased 
service conditions”), as long as these did not clash with the needs of the system.73 The 
degree to which this tendency was beyond what would be awarded to a regular soldier 
with problems was left unclear. 
II. The Conscientious Objector Trials of 2003
A. Political Dissenters or Mutineers? The Left-Wing Conscientious Objection 
Movement and “The Five” Case 
While some of the military “problems” with conscientious objection were solved 
through disciplinary hearings and back-door exemptions from service, some objectors 
were more persistent. Five of the regular service objectors had repeatedly refused to 
enlist and could not be quietly accommodated otherwise. Three of them were not 
summoned by the Conscience Committee, as their actions and motivations 
demonstrated clearly that they were not pacifists, and therefore would not be exempted 
based on the current policies. After several repeated disciplinary hearings, and 
73
 Interview with the prosecutor in the conscientious objector cases.
according to a reportedly new, harsher, prosecution policy,74 the five objectors were 
finally tried, together, for Refusal to Obey Orders.75 All five retained the same attorney 
– Dr. Dov Khanin, a prominent jurist with a political background in the radical socialist 
political party “Hadash”. The military prosecution chose Captain Yaron Kostelitz, a 
young and promising member of the Chief Military Prosecutor’s office, to handle all 
affairs pertaining to conscientious objectors.76 Kostelitz, an Orthodox Jew, was 
reportedly chosen for this task not only for his formidable professional talents, but also
“because we needed someone that would be convinced of his righteousness and without 
any conflict about the case”.77 The main defense argument claimed the existence of a 
“right to conscience” as a basic right and a legal defense against the indictment. 
After the objectors were arrested, and following a consultation in court in which the 
prosecution’s agreement was obtained, they were released to “open detention”, 
enabling them relative freedom, and the ability to appear for the hearings uncuffed.78
While in “open detention”, the defendants wore uniforms, but they appeared in court in 
civilian clothes.79 The prosecutor, with little encouragement from the court, did not 
officially insist on demanding military attire, and the court, intent on providing as much 
“space” and fairness to the defendants, and careful not to appear as an arbitrary military 
74
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tribunal, did not demand it. This allowed the defendants a symbolic victory, in the 
sense that in their public appearances, as opposed to their hidden detention duties, they 
did not submit to the military apparatus.80
The trial began in March 2003 and ended with a convicting verdict on December 16th 
and an imprisonment sentence in early February 2004. Each stage of the process was 
contested by the objectors. In the outset, the defense attorney attempted to dismiss the 
indictment, claiming that the law discriminated against the defendants, all male, by 
allowing women the possibility of exemption based on conscientious motives,81 and
also that the flaws in the conscience committee’s work amounted, as he argued, to an 
“outrageous injustice” that would require refraining from trying the defendants. These 
claims, as well as a claim to lack of jurisdiction, were categorically rejected by the 
military court. The court referred to the release of women as a mistake, but one that did 
not amount, even with the addition of other flaws, to such an “outrage” that would 
justify dismissing the indictment. 
Following the opening speeches in April, the defendants were finally heard in June 23rd
and July 14th. The five objectors were direct-examined one by one, and only following all 
80
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 Article 36 of the SECURITY SERVICE ACT, 1982; the article has since been narrowly reinterpreted by the 
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direct examinations were cross-examined by the prosecutor, in the same order.82 In this 
manner, the “five” were treated as a group, and their testimonies regarded, for procedural 
purposes, as five parts of the same testimony. This arrangement benefited the defendants 
because it allowed them to present their full versions in direct examination, before being 
cross-examined; it also presented them to the court, and the audience, not as five separate
people but as a united frontier. The court allowed the defendants ample time to present 
their versions; the direct testimonies took about two to four hours each. Every defendant 
chose to approach them in a different manner; some told their personal histories and how 
those had led them to oppose the occupation by refusing to serve. Some gave more 
general treatises about Israel’s policy in the territories.83 Although the court did not rule 
on the legality of the occupation,84 it did allow the defendants to speak extensively about 
the matter. This strategy of providing nearly unlimited “voice” to the defendants 
benefited both parties to the trial. On one hand, in the symbolic level, the defendants 
could present their versions to the court in a coherent, organized, ample manner, standing 
cross-examination only after all defendants had been heard at length. This testimony style 
was later hailed in left-wing publications, who praised the lucid, thoughtful and well 
articulated manifestos of the defendants.85 On the other hand, strategically, this method 
also allowed the prosecutor to get a better impression of the general argument and to 
organize the cross-examination accordingly. 
82
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The direct examinations on July 14th were interrupted by the testimony of the Draft 
Bureau commander as to the act of refusal, and as to the proceedings with the defendants. 
This witness was declared hostile by the defense and cross-examined about the lack of 
thorough treatment and regulations in the matter of conscientious objection. Following a 
his testimony, the direct testimonies of the five defendants continued on the same day. 
The September 18th and October 20th meetings included cross-examination of the 
defendants, followed by extensive oral and written summations from the prosecution and 
defense throughout November.
The court’s verdict was delivered on December 16th; not only had the court decided to 
convict the defendants, it also ruled that the current policy, distinguishing between 
pacifists and political objectors, was constitutionally sound. In addition, the court’s 
impression of the defendants was not of personal morality motivated people, but of 
political instigators.86 An appeal was submitted in the defendants’ name, but later 
retracted, according to the media out of a conviction that they “would not receive a fair 
trial” in the Military Court of Appeals.
The sentencing hearing on December 23rd revealed the difference in opinion about the 
suitable punishment for the objectors. The prosecutor’s summation referred to the 
objectors as “ideological criminals” and argued that they were more dangerous than 
“ordinary criminals”, but the defense attorney thought their honesty and idealism merited 
great leniency. One judge voted for a 20-month punishment, one for a year-long sentence, 
86
 See a detailed analysis of the verdict ahead in part III.
and one for merely six months of imprisonment. According to military criminal 
procedure, the middle judge’s opinion was accepted.87
On February 17th, weeks after “the five” were sentenced to imprisonment, a hearing was 
conducted to determine whether they would remain in the military facility or be 
transferred to a civilian prison.88 While the military prison services wished to transfer 
“the five” away, the prisoners objected, asking to remain in military custody. The final 
decision of the committee stated that the parties had agreed that the defendants remain in 
military custody; apparently, after much deliberation between the committee members (in 
which no unanimous solution was reached) they were notified by “the five”’s legal 
representative of removing their objection to the transfer. This consensus, reads the 
decision, rendered the committee’s deliberation unnecessary. It is hinted, though, that the 
“five” felt the army was “threatened by them”.89 The message conveyed by the “five”’s 
representative tells a somewhat different story, according to which in the hearing the 
prison representative had indicated his intent to “place the prisoners under a moral 
dilemma” and “send them for coercive labor in the territories”. This message had led 
them to remove their objection to the transfer.90
87
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While the five defendants were serving their imprisonment terms in different civilian 
facilities, and anticipating their early release hearing,91 their parents started a website92 in 
which they requested funding for the parole hearings. The parental effort on behalf of 
“the five” included a “documentary reading theater”, performed in Tel Aviv early June 
2004, and featuring dramatized readings from the trial records. The defense attorney, Dov 
Khanin, was scheduled to appear as himself in the play.93 In addition, the defense 
attorneys of the “five” and Yoni Ben Arzti (see below) co-edited and published an 
anthology of court documents from both cases, including the defendants’ testimonies, 
written and oral summations by the parties, and the court’s verdicts.94
On July 15th, the parole board decided to shorten the five objectors’ prison sentences by a 
third, establishing September 15th as their date of release. While being a standard parole 
release, it had two unusual features: firstly, contrary to the prosecution’s request, and 
contrary to the standard requirement from parolees, the “five” were not required to 
express remorse as a condition for their release; secondly, the committee recommended 
bringing all “five” before an unsuitability committee, in order to allow for their release 
from service.95
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B. Are You a Good Pacifist or a Bad Pacifist? The Ben Artzi Case 
Concurrent to the “five” case, a separate military trial was being held for another
conscientious objector, Yoni Ben Artzi. Ben Artzi’s case was tried separately because it 
brought up different doctrinal questions, although the issue was similar. Like some of 
“the five”, Ben Artzi had been summoned to the conscience committee, at his request,
prior to being drafted; however, unlike the “five”, he did not merely claim to have 
political left-wing views, but stated that he was a pacifist and objected to engaging in 
any form of military activity. The committee was not convinced that his mind was fully 
made, and he was ordered to take a year and “solidify his opinion” in the matter of 
military service. In the following hear, Ben Artzi appeared again before the committee, 
which acknowledged that his mind was, at this point, more “solidly made” about his 
refusal to enlist, but decided that he was not a genuine pacifist, and would not, 
therefore, be exempted from service. The committee stressed that Ben Artzi’s issues 
with the army referred more to his left-wing views and to his inability to adjust to 
coercive institutions and frameworks.96
Ben Artzi certainly did not accept this decision quietly; he submitted a petition for its 
reversal to the High Court of Justice97 In his petition he raised a list of procedural flaws 
in the Conscience Committee’s hearing, such as the lack of legal representation and the 
impossibility to bring witnesses. The court held in his favor and pressed the military 
authorities into a compromise which entitled Ben Artzi to a third appearance before the 
96
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committee, in which he was represented by an attorney, submitted an abundance of 
written material – including letters from his siblings, both graduate students in the US, 
and produced two witnesses: his parents. For the third time, the committee rejected Ben 
Artzi’s request for exemption, and expressed its view, according to which political 
convictions and personal maladjustments were the core of his request. Snippets of the 
dialogue in the committee hearings were presented later, in the military trial, and 
indicated a problematic and misinformed approach to the issue, at best. Apparently, the 
committee members had shown Ben Artzi headlines from daily newspapers reporting 
of suicide bombings, to confront him with the immorality of refusal under such 
circumstances; they also argued that his refusal stems from his unwillingness to accept 
authority, which reflected a far from pacifist personality.98 Incidents from Ben Artzi’s 
school days – one in which he refused to wear a kippa99 to a military cemetery on 
Remembrance Day, and another in which he did not participate in a school-organized 
bus ride to a demonstration to support the Supreme Court – were interpreted to 
illustrate his nonconformism and unwillingness to adjust to coercive frameworks such 
as school or the army. In addition, Ben Artzi was asked whether he would have fought 
the Nazis in World War II. This question, highly problematic in Israel because of the 
Holocaust context, puts those subjected to it in a difficult position: if answered in the 
affirmative, they would not be regarded as pacifists; otherwise, the person in question 
displays very questionable morality.100
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An additional complication was Ben Artzi’s activism in support of, and with, 
politically-motivated objectors such as “the five”. His association with left-wing 
protesters, and the leftist opinions in his immediate family,101 blurred, in the 
committee’s perspective, the “purity” of his pacifist agenda.
Following the committee’s decision, Ben Artzi was ordered to enlist in the army; since 
August 2000 he refused the draft seven times, each leading to a disciplinary hearing 
and an imprisonment sentence. These sentences altogether amounted to over 200 days 
in prison. When Ben Artzi refused the draft for the eighth time, he was indicted in 
military court.
The parties gave their opening speeches and testimonies were heard. The defense 
attorney, Michael Sfard, a young attorney at a well-known law office and a reservist 
conscientious objector himself,102 presented the defense case: the defendant was not 
guilty of “refusal to obey orders”, because he was a genuine pacifist, a fact which the 
committee failed to recognize due to its flawed and unregulated procedures. The 
defense made considerable efforts in presenting various aspects of this argument. To 
prove Ben Artzi’s genuine pacifism, the defense presented testimonies from him and 
his sister; to address the committee’s arbitrariness and flawed procedure, the defense 
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asked the court’s permission, on June 19th, to summon for testimony two high-ranked 
officers, including the conscience committee chair. The prosecutor objected to this 
move, claiming that the committee’s work had already been scrutinized by the High 
Court of Justice and would not need to be discussed any further. The court, however, 
moved to allow for both testimonies, stating that they do so beyond their due process 
obligations and as a courtesy to the defendant: 
The defendant was brought to justice before a military court for not doing an 
action which he claims is against his conscience. In many ways, there is no little 
uniqueness in our trial… in this stage, when the defendant defends himself with 
the few tools given to him by criminal law, we think that we should minimize 
using the court’s authority to block the defendant’s path from trying to make us 
doubt, using a tool or this or that legal construction, that he might not have 
committed the offense attributed to him.103
The court’s meeting on June 22nd included the testimony of Ben Artzi’s sister. She was 
cross examined about media reports regarding her brother’s leftist views; the sister 
maintained that her brother’s political views were to be separated from his pacifist 
perspective. The court also heard the testimony of an objector whose views were 
similar to Ben Artzi’s and who was nevertheless released from service. 
The July 29th court meeting was to be a pivotal date in the trial’s development. After a 
long examination by the defense as a “hostile witness”, the conscience committee chair 
admitted that “Yoni genuinely believe[d] he [was] a pacifist”, but that despite this 
genuine belief, the committee found him not to be so, due, among other factors, to the 
fact that he had stated he would have fought the Nazis in World War II. The committee 
chair also also testified that the committee did not have any stated regulations. This 
testimony was to lead the court, in the summation hearing, to ask the military 
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authorities to reconsider granting Ben Artzi a fourth hearing before the committee, this 
time with a civilian philosopher as one of the members. 
On August 10th the court heard another military officer, the Head of Personnel Planning 
Unit, testify as to the “lighter service” options he had offered to Ben Artzi, including 
service in a hospital wearing civilian clothes – offers which Ben Artzi had declined. 
Later on the same day, the defense requested that the court summon Avi Sagi, a 
philosophy professor at Bar Ilan University and the first civilian to be a member of the 
conscience committee, to testify as to its flawed proceedings, in light of a critical 
interview with him published on Ha’aretz newspaper . This petition stemmed from a 
wish to respect Sagi’s request not to be summoned as a defense witness against the 
committee in which he had served. The court denied the petition, allowing the defense 
to summon Sagi as a defense witness, but the defense chose not to do so. On the same 
meeting, as mentioned above, the court asked that the personnel unit reconsider hearing 
Ben Artzi’s case for the fourth time. The motive for this request was mostly Colonel 
Simchi’s testimony, according to which the committee thought Ben Artzi to be genuine 
in his paficist agenda. The personnel unit took several days to consider its position, then 
rejected the court’s request; the trial continued, and the parties’ oral summations were 
heard on October 9th.
In the verdict, given on November 12th, the court acknowledged to some extent the 
flaws in the committee’s proceedings; it stated its belief that Ben Artzi was, indeed, a 
pacifist. The court even repeated its request to hear Ben Artzi’s case once more at the 
conscience committee. However, it still stated that Ben Artzi should have obeyed the 
order to report for duty, and convicted him. In interviews, the defense attorney 
expressed satisfaction with the “partial victory”. 
While waiting for the sentence, Ben Artzi appeared before the committee for the fourth 
time. The committee decided to release him from service, but without admitting it had 
been wrong at denying him pacifist status; the decision was that Ben Artzi was selfish 
and would not make any useful contribution to the army. In the committee hearings, 
and in newspaper interviews before the sentence  Ben Arzti did not express any wish to 
volunteer for some sort of alternative service, but to continue his studies at the 
university. This attitude deviated from the “customary” conscientious objectors’ 
readiness to engage in non-military voluntary activities, and infuriated the court as well 
as the committee: mentioned rather negatively in the sentence, given on April 24th, Ben 
Artzi was sentenced to two months imprisonment and a fine, which, if unpaid, would 
result in two more months of imprisonment. The Ben Artzi family reported, in an email 
to its supporters, that Ben Artzi did not intend to pay the fine.
Ben Artzi’s appeal of his conviction and sentence was heard on July 9th, before an 
unusual set of five judges, all of them Generals by rank; while the court treated the 
appellant with dignity and showed a willingness to discuss literary and philosophical 
themes, it ended up denying the appeal.
C. Flexibility and Legitimacy
As the stories of the two cases demonstrate, the policies and practices toward the 
objectors resemble an exciting game of chess, with the defendants and their 
representatives as articulated and resourceful opponents who respond to the court’s 
strategies with counterstrategies. The court is willing to allow the objectors in both cases 
significant flexibility in their attire and demeanor in court, as well as in summoning 
military personnel as hostile witnesses. In addition, the court is willing to assimilate 
extra-legal content into the hearings; the defendants’ dissenting ideologies are heard at 
length, and the court even delves into their personal biographies to seek the origins of 
said ideologies. The following sections in part III, which provide a reading of the 
narratives and ideas in the verdicts, examine the extent to which this leeway is given in 
the final decisions. 
III. Legal and Extra-Legal Discourse in Conscientious Objector Verdicts
A. Defining the Problem: Highlighting Danger, Downplaying Controversy
The court’s notion of the offenses in both trials is constructed through the set of 
narratives surrounding the ethos of compulsory and egalitarian military service and 
presented in section I.B above. These narratives are the source of the court’s knowledge 
about the severity and dangers presented by the offense. 
Politically motivated conscientious objection is presented as ideological crime, which 
constitutes a direct challenge to the law’s validity. The dissenters’ arguments might 
persuade others and break down the ideological-legal fabric on which service is based:
This is ideological or political crime, and it is more severe and dangerous than 
regular criminal activity stemming from a wish for personal benefit… not only do 
they disobey the law, they renounce its compulsory power. They might be imitated 
by others, enjoy the support of people and public institutions, which hinders an 
egalitarian enforcement of law, and might gather around them a large public, who 
might be prepared to exhibit violence behavior to the point of mutin y and rebellion 
against the authorized government, that is, democratic society.104
The militarist, patriotic aspect of the duty of service is undermined by the ambiguity 
created by objection and the public debate surrounding it; importing political conflict into 
the military arena is seen in a negative light due to “the essence of military service and its 
connection to life risks; the security situation of the state and the need for personnel to 
execute military tasks”.105
The risks embedded in a legalization of conscientious objection constitute a challenge to 
both militarist and egalitarian considerations. Based on the legal principle of 
universalism, any right provided for the defendants must also be provided for everyone 
else. This theoretical broadening of the group receiving the rights leads the court to fear 
the following scenario: 
It is not necessary to prove that acknowledging [the rights of] selective objectors 
might import the severe ideological-political conflict in the public about the 
righteousness of the government’s actions in the territories into the arena of military 
draft, the duty to serve, and perhaps even into the army… [and subsequently] split 
the army into those who are willing to enlist in an army which engages in certain 
actions, and those who are willing to enlist in an army which engages in other 
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actions. The path from here to a split of the nation to several nations is not so far, 
and there is no need for experts to prove it.106
One discourse which remains unelaborated, though by no means ignored, is the issue of 
military ethics, challenged by the objectors. The court knowingly and ostensibly refuses 
to engage in a discussion as to the righteousness of the defendants’ opinions; it chooses to 
decide the case based on the premise that these positions are subjective. However, the 
verdicts tread on thin ice in their treatment of the defendants’ perspectives. In the Ben 
Artzi case, where the defendant claimed that, from his pacifist perspective, the order to 
enlist in the army was “clearly and obviously illegal”, the court rejected this claim relying 
on the Supreme Court order to draft; the fact that another judicial authority intervened 
suggests a set of circumstances where enlistment would not “clearly and obviously” 
violate legality:
Even if the test [for a ‘clearly and obviously illegal’ command] were subjective, we 
still thought that the defendant would have to obey the command. Since the Israeli 
Supreme Court ordered the defendant to enlist and begin his service… a legal 
obligation [to so do] was imposed on the defendant. Surely it cannot be said that an 
order to obey and order under these circumstances is an action which is clearly and 
obviously (even to the defendant) illegal.107
The court faces an even more problematic situation in ‘the five’ case, where the 
defendants questioned the legality of the army’s involvement in the territories. The 
solution implemented by the court was quoting a significant amount of Supreme Court 
decisions authorizing military activities in the territories from the prosecutor’s written 
summations, and then stating that, despite these quotes, they would not take a stand in the 
matter:
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This court is not, of course, the forum to examine the legality of this or that 
governmental action, and it certainly is not the proper place to examine the 
government’s policy toward the held territories and their local inhabitants or the 
implications of this policy on the state’s citizens.108
We state immediately, our quotation of the essence of these sources [legitimizing 
the army’s activity in the territories] was meant only to test the credibility of the 
defendants’ claims that their conscience tells them to act like they did… the court 
does not intend, is not authorized and is even unable to express any opinion about 
these claims.109
B. Understanding the Offenders: “Good” and “Bad” Moral Dissent
As explained in section I.C, II.A and II.B, both trials presented the court with 
ideologically motivated, resourceful and articulate defendants, who were prepared to 
stand the consequences of trial for their beliefs but nevertheless devised sophisticated 
defense strategies. The legal system’s response to this unique population is evident not 
only from its reluctance to reach the stage of military criminal trials, but also from the 
court verdicts. Though in most instances the court refers to the objectors as “the 
defendants”, it also uses their first names, particularly in the first thirty pages of the 
“five” case. It also mistakenly refers to one of the “five” as a “witness”, rather than a 
“defendant”.
The uniqueness of conscientious objection cases may therefore partly account for the 
court’s interest in constructing their personalities and motivations; however, the court’s 
endeavors to understand the defendants in these cases also stem from the importance it 
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ascribes to their ideologies, the driving force behind the act of conscientious objection. 
As mentioned above, it is obvious that the court takes these defendants very seriously; it 
seeks to learn the “etiology of ideology” behind the defendants’ actions. As the court 
poetically phrases it in the Ben Artzi case, it is interested in “the evolutionary history of 
his ideological pattern of thinking… where and when his thought bloomed with the seeds 
of thought and pacifist belief”.110
Indeed, both verdicts focus to a great extent on the defendants and their personal 
histories. In the “five” trial, the court engages in meticulous retelling of each and every 
defendant’s personal story, including their childhoods, the political atmosphere in their 
homes and families, their political experiences and activities through middle-school and 
high-school, and their insights on the situation developed both before the draft and 
following incarceration for refusing it. The verdict contains accounts of an Israeli-
Palestinian science summer camp in which one of the defendants had participated while 
in high school, as well as of Palestinian aid organizations in which the defendants were 
members as students and of their involvement in such activism;111 it also contains quotes 
from the defendants themselves as to their beliefs.112 In the Ben Artzi trial, the evidence
cited in the verdict includes his arguments with teachers over school trip routes involving 
entrance to the territories, his mother’s account of his refusal to wear a “kippa” in a 
military cemetery, an extensive testimony of the defendant’s sister (defined by the 
prosecutor as “an expert witness [whose expertise is] Yoni”), and references to the 
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opinions of his parents, grandfather, schoolteachers, and friends about the nature of his 
objection. 
A narrow reading of the court’s role questions the necessity for such information; for the 
purposes of conviction – deciding where the defendants’ behavior lay regarding the 
pacifist/political legal dichotomy - the only necessary information is whether the 
defendants refuse to be drafted after being ordered to do so, and whether they have 
received exemption as pacifists (none of them did: the “five” because they never claimed 
to be pacifists, and Ben Artzi because the committee did not grant him exemption despite 
his claim to be one). In fact, these are the issues by which the two cases were eventually 
decided: the “five” were not pacifists, and therefore were not eligible to be discharged by 
the conscience committee, and Ben- Artzi, despite his pacifism, was not legally 
discharged by the committee, whose actions, though faulty, did not render its decision 
void. The court, however, sets off on an enterprise to understand the psychological and 
historical emergence of the defendants as autonomous adult agents with opinions.113
This enterprise, however, does not lead the court to draw a comprehensive and complex 
portrait of the defendants, but rather to the much more legal and prosaic task of 
classifying them into Weberian “ideal types”114 according to their motivation. This 
classification process serves the court not only in its decision to convict in both cases, but 
also in creating a rhetoric of who should be seen more and less favorably by the system. 
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For the purpose of this classification, the court seeks to reduce the opinions and actions of 
each of the defendants into monolithic, mutually-exclusive categories based on their main 
motive: pacifism (termed “total conscientious objection”), personal discomfort stemming 
from political dissent (“selective conscientious objection”), or a will to bring about a 
change in public opinion and possibly to convince others to object to serve (“civil 
disobedience”).    
In “the five” case, the court emphasizes the distinction between the second and third of 
these categories: selective (political) objectors whose motive is personal and those whose 
intentions are to cause political change. These categories are a simplification of the 
philosophical categories of “civil disobedience” and “conscientious objection”.115 While 
the current legal order does not distinguish between the two for the purpose of the 
legal/illegal distinction, the court might have seen this categorization as an answer to the 
defense’s argument for acknowledging objection on political, as well as pacifist, grounds. 
The court does not give the defense any hope that such rights might be granted, but even 
within the group of political objectors, which do not enjoy the potential of discharge from 
service, it renders some to be more positive and less harmful than others. The “good” 
objector in this categorization is a good-willed, sensitive individual who does not seek to 
change the world, but merely to remove himself from a morally detrimental environment. 
This objector can be described as a positive character, and is expected by the court to 
exhibit altruistic, highly moral behavior in all respects except willingness to serve in the 
115
 The categories used by the court do not map neatly onto those defined by Rawls; their “legal” version 
makes them mutually exclusive for the purpose of classification. In fact, the categories resemble more a 
classification unquoted by the court, made by LINN (supra note 41) following COHEN (supra note 7), 
between “personal” and “political” motivations.
army. The “bad” objectors, by contrast, do not conform to this ideal picture; they are 
“political” objectors, social agitators who seek political change. 
The court finds the”five” (as a group) to fit in the second category. In the verdict, as well 
as in the sentence and in previous decisions regarding their imprisonment terms, the 
“five” are described as political changers and revolutionists. This image is created 
through an analysis of the “five”’s political activities, particularly as high-school seniors. 
Setting aside the question of jurisdiction over motives and actions committed by the 
defendant as civilians, the interesting notion here is that of monolithic, mutually-
exclusive motives for action: according to the verdict, one can be either a conscientious 
objector, or a political advocate of civil disobedience, but not both. The court does pay 
some homage to Joseph Raz, quoting him to say that it is possible to be “over-
determined” in motivation, and therefore to be both at the same time, but it prefers its 
own theory of personality:  
We found that we are close to the opinion… according to which, although the 
possibility of duality in motives is possible, it is, in general, a theoretical and distant
possibility. We thought that the main motive hiding behind the actions of the 
defendants before us, considering the totality of circumstances surrounding their 
actions, is the will to cause a political change, that is, to bring about a change in 
public opinion and the governmental policy. We doubt whether the conscientious 
motive, in itself, is enough to be a basis to the defendants’ refusal, based on the 
totality of the things they said. Yet, we are ready to avoid stating unambiguously, 
that the civil disobedience motive is the only one moving the defendants, and to 
assume, that it is also a motive of conscientious objection which moves them, 
perhaps even as a sufficient motive, to commit the act of refusal.116
This distinction is then abandoned for the sake of the traditional legal distinction between 
pacifists and political objectors, for reasons of manageability; the court creates a flawed 
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and uneasy equivalence between the distinction conscientious objection/civil 
disobedience and the distinction pacifism/political dissent, justifying it by the need for 
visible, workable indications, and even quoting Chief Justice Barak as to the value of 
clear definitions at the expense of accurate but complex ones. 
Interestingly, the “good”/”bad” distinction has nothing to do with actual goodness or 
honesty. In the verdict, one of the judges describes the defendants as “positive and value-
minded young men in their essence”,117 praise which is of little assistance as punishment 
is imposed; similarly, the court is at pains to clarify that the virtue of honesty is to no 
avail in the legal/illegal distinction:
There is no point to plant within the petitioners’ hearts the illusion, as if the 
committee might exempt them from service if it thinks they are honest in what they 
say, and it would have been right to clarify to them immediately, that their refusal to 
serve, driven by motives of said kind does not, according to current policy, award 
an exemption from service.118
Ironically, it is precisely the defendants’ honesty about their history and opinions which 
provides the court with the information that classifies them as “bad” objectors; less 
honest defendants could be better off by presenting themselves as pacifists and cloaking 
their political agendas. The catch is, of course, that conscientious objection is, by 
definition, an offense which stems from honesty and personal integrity; thus, the 
defendants’ true accounts of their motives are utilized by the court for their conviction. 
The Ben Artzi case presents more complexity for the enterprise of classification, as he 
defies the court’s distinction between “good” and “bad” conscientious objectors in more 
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than one way. He is found to be a genuine pacifist (despite the committee’s findings), but 
this is hard for the court to reconcile with his other traits: a radical left-wing political 
view and an inability to conform to coercive institutions. Ben Artzi also refuses to 
redeem himself in the court’s eyes, by proclaiming that, contrary to the “good” objector’s 
stereotype, he will not volunteer to do community service in civilian life.119 The court 
tries to make sense of Ben Artzi’s enigmatic personality by collapsing all these 
complexities and perspective onto a one-dimensional personality model. Instead of 
accounting for the possibility that a person’s views on conflict resolution methods can be 
detached from his views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and his ability to conform, 
they undo the contradictions by negating their possibility, or, in the very least, making it 
unlikely. The judges state that “lack of ability to adjust to a mandatory framework” and 
pacifism are linked: a pacifist person is a minority in Israel and cannot adjust to the 
framework anyway because of his unpopular beliefs. Moreover, the connection between 
the two traits is so strong that it cannot, supposedly, be deciphered – it is, as the court 
describes it, a “chicken and egg problem”: “Is the inability to adjust to the military 
framework a consequence of the pacifist belief, or perhaps the pacifist belief is the cause 
[sic – probably meant “result”] of the inability to adjust to, or to accept, the existence of a 
military framework, whose goals are defined the way they are defined, and whose means 
are the way they are?!”120 A similar logical ploy collapses pacifism and left-wing 
political views into the same category: “The defendant distinguished… between the 
pacifist belief and the political view (though it is clear that a pacifistic view will be 
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difficult to reconcile with a different political view)”.121 Thus, Ben Artzi’s personality is 
reconstructed onto a simplified model, allowing for his classification as a “bad” 
conscientious objector, and leading to his conviction despite his proclamation as a 
pacifist. It also allows for a negative representation of him in the sentence, which echoes 
the committee’s original impression of him, while acknowledging that he is a genuine 
pacifist.
C. Using Knowledge: Legal and Extra-Legal Sources for Perceiving the Problem
What are the epistemological sources used by the court to construct these images of the 
offense and the offenders? A careful reading of the verdicts uncovers a self referential
pattern, according to which, while the court is exposed to political and philosophical 
narratives, it eventually turns to internal legal sources, by way of self-reference, as its 
preferred source of knowledge of conscientious objection. However, the resourcefulness 
of the defendants and their representatives does have an influence as to the way the legal 
sources are applied to the problem.  
As shown before, the court does not perceive the offenders as regular criminal 
defendants, and even hesitates to refer to them as such. This avoidance of criminal law as 
the relevant legal discipline for the case, which is, after all, a criminal case, is discernible 
from the way the verdicts avoid discussing the elements of actus reus and mens rea. In 
fact, the main discourse used by the court in the verdicts is the constitutional language of 
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rights, and the verdict uses this discourse to identify the questions it wishes to address 
and answer. In the Ben Artzi case, the court merely wants to identify how much of the 
defendant’s refusal is “political”, and thus dangerous, and how much of it is owed to a 
non-political, low-profile, pacifist perspective, which poses less problems for the system:
1. What is the weight of the right to conscience in Israeli law?
2. Was the defendant’s draft legal and valid in respect to the fallacies in the 
committee’s work – what is the normative meaning of the committee’s decision?
3. Does the defendant enjoy a criminal defense barring his criminal conviction in 
the offense he has allegedly committed?122
The parties’ perspectives are also presented in legal-constitutional terms:
Indeed, ostensibly, it seems that each one of the parties is in a completely different 
plane in their arguments. The prosecutor is in the plane of giving validity to the 
draft order… and the defense attorney, he is in the plane of examining the criminal 
defenses available to the defendant which stem from the power of the constitutional 
right to act according to conscience.123
Similarly, in the “five” case, the agenda is framed in constitutional terms and dressed in 
the philosophical garments of “conscientious objection” versus “civil disobedience”. 
 A. Have the defendants in their testimonies managed to convince that their refusal 
to serve is built on moral-ideological foundations?
B. Do the reasons for their refusal constitute conscientious objection, civil 
disobedience, or a mixture of the two?
C. What is the implication of deciding this question – in case we are dealing with 
acts of civil disobedience or mixed acts of civil disobedience and conscientious 
objection – do the defendants then enjoy a defense from criminal conviction?
D. Assuming the defendant’s refusal is based on a conscientious cause (alone or in 
addition to other causes), does freedom of conscience enjoy the defense that basic 
rights enjoy?
E. And if so – is there an existing law, that allows such infringement in these 
circumstances? What are the opposing interests that might justify a violation of the 
right to free conscience? Were such interests proved in the case before us? Has the 
balancing between them lead to the finding, that the violation of the right to free 
conscience is in a measure that does not exceed the necessary?124
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The main two branches of knowledge relied upon in the verdicts to answer these 
constitutional questions are the judicial art of legal reasoning (the ability to weigh 
considerations and interpret laws ‘correctly’) and political philosophy. There are two 
interesting aspects of this choice of disciplines. Firstly, the judges do not see any 
necessity to get insights from social science or empirical research. This in itself is not 
news; the novelty lies in the fact that the “five” verdict explicitly deals with the question 
of empirical knowledge and rejects its relevance. Prompted by the defense’s claim, 
according to which no empirical evidence was admitted to show the potential danger to 
the Israeli state should the defendants’ acts be legalized, the court states:
We are speaking of matters that are known to everyone, things that were claimed 
again and again in front of the different courts, and adopted by them. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court, sitting as High Court of Justice, stated the main part of these doubts 
and dangers, and adopted them as a cause and a reason to avoid assisting the 
petitioners, who had addressed it asking to legally recognize their refusal to perform 
military service.125
In this manner, court rulings, by the very fact of their existence on paper, become 
empirical evidence; court opinions, by becoming part of the precedent historical 
reservoir, become facts. The court goes much further by referring to legal and 
philosophical articles submitted by the prosecutor as a “Brandeis Brief”. They describe 
its contents as follows:
To the findings file, which was presented to the court, were added, in addition to the 
Supreme Court’s verdicts and those of other (military) courts, articles and letters, 
which were written by jurists, philosophers and thinkers from the fields of society 
and humanities.126
The “thinkers in fields of society and humanities” mentioned are six scholars in the fields 
of jurisprudence and philosophy; it is therefore unclear what the “fields of society” are. In 
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any case, the court is obviously of the opinion that Supreme Court precedents and 
doctrinal academic treatises will supply it with all the empirical information it needs 
about the risks of conscientious objection.  
The discipline of philosophy seems to enjoy a more favored status in the eyes of the 
court, but the legal adoption of philosophical concepts happens in accordance with law’s 
internal terms. Both the “five” and the Ben Artzi verdicts are garnished with quotes from 
legal philosophers, but these are not used to achieve any material goals. The court uses 
the terms “civil disobedience” and “conscientious objection”, both staples of political 
philosophy, but never dives into the conceptualization behind them; rather, it chooses to 
use a crude distinction between “total objectors” to the military in general and “specific 
objectors” to specific military actions, as supposedly representing the finer one suggested 
by philosophy. As explained above, this simplification is justified by its workability. It 
therefore seems that the homage paid to philosophy is mainly symbolic, and when the 
court needs information, it prefers to be assisted by juridical wisdom. The court’s reliance 
on previous verdicts is valid because, according to the “five” verdict, 
the different verdicts, fruit of many years of thought, wisdom and life experience of
judges with and without legal education,  comprise within them real evidentiary 
power, as far as the interests, the risks and the dangers we have discussed above.127
As to the court’s own juridical reasoning and consciousness, this is described as 
“common knowledge” which is within the court’s permissible room for assumption. The 
verdict states that the national security situation “is within judicial knowledge”, and so is 
the risk to soldiers in service and the idea that “recognizing selective conscientious
objection constitutes a bypass of the democratic process and an unacceptable interference 
127 Ibid, 88.
in it”, a phenomenon that, if widened, will lead to a great divide of the Israeli public 
(another judicial assumption). As further justification for assuming all these things, and 
for not accepting any data to suggest empirical answers for them, the court compares 
these cases to “the appraisal of the risk from a defendant or suspect, whose arrest is being 
requested based on the possibility that he might endanger the public”,128 disregarding the 
social and political differences between the case at hand and the example provided. 
D. Achieving Goals: Punishing the Offenders and Obtaining Legitimacy
Applying the court’s perception of conscientious objection to the offenses and the 
offenders is aimed at achieving both ostensible and latent goals, both of which interact 
with the legal and extra-legal sources of knowledge used by the court.
The ostensible goal of the court in conscientious objector cases is achieving the end of 
punishment, primarily retribution and deterrence of future potential objectors. In the 
sentences, the court mentions the ends of punishment, focusing primarily on deterrence, 
but mentioning retribution as an additional reason for harsh punishment. As shown 
earlier, the compulsory and egalitarian military ethos, which conscientious objectors 
resist, builds on a patriotic emphasis on the necessity of defense and on social unity. The 
verdicts, therefore, emphasize general deterrence as an important aim: “This reason is a 
clear justification to punish defendants harshly so that the multitudes to whom the 
128 Ibid, 89.
defendants’ call was addressed will see, and fear, and understand, that the price for an act 
of refusal is painful, harsh punishment”.129
This rationale is particularly important due to the classification of “the five” as “bad” 
objectors, whose aim is to influence others; but it also leads to the court’s rejection of 
personal deterrence as an appropriate end of punishment in the case. The defense attorney 
is quoted saying that such consideration, in light of the ideological motive of the 
offenders, makes deterrence not only unnecessary, but unconstitutional. The court seems 
to partly agree, and rejects personal deterrence claiming it would make no sense in light
of the defendants’ strong conviction.130
The court also states, in both cases, its disapproval of the offenders and their 
classification as “bad” objectors to justify punishment on the basis of retribution. Most of 
“the five” verdict, as shown earlier, uses negative language to describe the defendants 
and justify harsh punishment, referring back to their classification as “bad” objectors who 
wish to the court seems to give more thought to the meaning of the ends of punishment, 
the way it sees them, in this particular case. Retribution, or desert, demands harsh 
punishment, though the judges are careful to add that “the army’s policy is to be harsh on 
those who are already in service and decide to refuse (like between deserters from service 
and draft evaders)”.131 In the Ben Artzi case, part of the retributive consideration is the 
court’s dislike of his unwillingness to contribute alternative service.132
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The court’s discussion of rehabilitation is particularly insightful. The sentence renders 
this end of punishment to be irrelevant for the “five” conscientious objectors because 
they were not moved to act the way they did out of lower social status, falling to 
poverty or drug abuse; they did not do what they did as an act stemming from loss 
of values. Therefore, and since the defendants have stressed, as mentioned above, 
that they do not see themselves serving in the army in the future, this consideration 
does not have weight in sentencing them.133
In the court’s mind, therefore, rehabilitation is not merely a general, amorphous lenient 
consideration; it is something designed for, and aimed at, the underclass, rather than at 
the affluent, verbal, intelligent and idealistic defendants in conscientious objection cases. 
This paragraph shows that the social resources available to these particular offenders are 
in the court’s mind even as it articulates constitutional and philosophical reasonings, 
though they are not explicitly mentioned in the verdicts themselves.
In its dealings with conscientious objection, the court recognizes that it works side by 
side with other military institutions, mainly the conscience committee. The alliance 
between the court and the committee, which occupies center stage in the Ben Artzi case, 
is an uneasy one. Although the court defends the committee from the defense’s attacks on 
its processes and capability (a task aided by the high standard of fault required for 
voiding the committee’s proceedings), it does not avoid thinly veiled criticism of the 
procedure. Similarly, the court is explicitly uncomfortable with the embarrassment laid at 
its door by the committee’s chair, who testified that Ben Artzi “genuinely thinks he is a 
pacifist” but is not one (see section II.B). They comment: “We cannot imagine, that this 
133
 “The five” case, sentence, 18.
part (the defendant’s honesty) escaped the testimony of the senior officer, but any 
reference to it was absent from his decision”.134
In light of these ostensible goals, whose balance justifies harsh sentencing, how does the 
court justify its procedural flexibility in the conscientious objector trials, and its readiness 
to award the defendants a ‘voice’ by discussing their political opinions and biographies? 
The answer lies in the verdict’s latent agenda, aimed at obtaining legitimacy for its 
decision. In order to perpetuate the ethos of compulsory and egalitarian service, the court 
needs to reject, epistemologically, the objectors’ position. However, in order for such a 
decision to be validated by the verdict’s audience – the defendants, the media, the 
Supreme Court and academic scholarship – the court must show that the decision was 
reached in compliance with every possible aspect of judicial fairness: an absolute lack of 
bias, particularly of the political persuasion, procedural flexibility, and a willingness to 
award the defendants ample opportunities to state their case.  
How does the court display its fairness? As mentioned in part II, the hearings themselves, 
by being procedurally flexible and substantively inclusive, are an important contribution. 
The verdicts, too, are at pains to show the court as a legitimate, unbiased institution. In 
both verdicts, ample space is provided for the presentation of the defense position and 
compliments are given to the legal representatives of both parties; the court cleverly 
dissociates itself from the political issues raised in the case by presenting the defendants’ 
political criticism in direct quotations rather than paraphrasing it. These methods, 
anticipating possible external criticism of the verdicts, present the court as playing the 
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rules of the game in a very forgiving manner, and still reaching a convicting 
conclusion.135
Conclusion: Law’s Response to Political Dissent: 
Simplification, Categorization, and Self-Reference
Justifying a verdict requires a convincing, straightforward account of the offense, the 
offender and the goals in addressing them. The court, as seen in the cases discussed in 
this article, works to make sense of complex people and unclear realities by creating clear 
standards and stereotypes to which people must adhere. 
This quality of judicial decisionmaking is not endemic to judicial decisions regarding 
conscientious objection; the usage of “masks” to collapse people and situations into 
categories that would be easier to handle is extensively discussed by Noonan,136 who 
highlights the judicial tendency to prefer “masks” and rules over persons, and the usage 
of concepts such as property to do so; similarly, feminist socio-legal research has studied 
the court’s response to women defendants who do not conform to feminine, family-
centered stereotypes.137 As shown in this literature, the court seeks to reduce human 
complexity into manageable compartments; people are expected to be understood, 
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logical, coherent, and to have specified and distinctive motivations for their actions. This 
is the case with the conscientious objectors in the two verdicts: the court’s understanding 
of the nature of the problem creates “good” and “bad” personalities of defendants and the 
verdicts adhere to these categorizations when trying to make sense out of the situations 
and the people involved. 
What is unique to the conscientious objection population is the content of the legal 
categories designed to perceive and address their actions. According to the court, the key 
to be a “good” conscientious objector is to be less politicized , less controversial , more
personal and less public. The “good” conscientious objector is someone who has a 
general, well-developed, theory of personal morality; a pacifist who, unlike the court’s 
perception of Ben Artzi, conforms to what the court sees as “pacifist behavior” – a 
pleasant, nonconfrontational person who cares more about personal ideals on social 
welfare than about public activism. A “bad” conscientious objector is someone who 
“uses” his action to influence others, or someone who defies the positive stereotypes 
associated with the “good” objector; for these people, the court borrows, and modifies, 
the philosophical concept of civil disobedience.
In order to uphold these standards of behavior, the court establishes binary monolithic 
truths by forcing the complexity of human nature into a framework, and even when the 
presence of more than one motive for action is evident, the question is which one is the 
dominant one. These motives are then applied by the court, without the aid of any 
empirical extrapolation tools, to make judgment about empirical risks and chances for 
limiting rights. For conscientious objectors, the court leads an uneasy and inaccurate 
dialogue with philosophy, only to reinforce the usage of its own instant, simple-to-apply 
categorization. Despite these references to external disciplines and professional expertise, 
the court eventually looks into itself, and into doctrinal law, to create these classification 
tools, trusting its judicial experience to guide it in the right way. 
In doing so the court treads a thin line between legal formalism – the adherence to 
Weberian categorization of cases – and openness to the extra-legal issues presented to it 
by the objectors themselves. As explained in section III.D, this course of action serves the 
court’s latent agenda of obtaining legitimacy. However, the court is not the only party 
gaining from this arrangement. The defendants in both cases are, based on their 
ideological eloquence and social milieu, people who have powerful resources at their 
disposal, and moreover, they are people who chose the legal arena to make a political 
point. By doing so, they knowingly undertake the risk of being found guilty and suffering 
the consequences. While in the narrow sense of legal outcome the objectors lose their 
cases, are convicted and punished, based on a narrow perception of them and their 
actions, the court’s willingness to provide them a platform to express their political 
dissent may translate to benefits in the broad arena of public opinion.138 Although this 
does not suggest a conspiratorial “bargain” between the court and the objectors, it 
certainly shows how choices in shaping the form of a trial may be the product of a win-
win situation, rather than the more traditional perception of criminal justice as an 
adversarial, competitive, zero-sum game.    
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A final comment pertains to the usefulness of using an examination of knowledge 
structures, rather than merely concepts of right and wrong, to analyze situations like the 
conscientious objection trials. As issues of resistance to governmental actions, and to 
military actions in particular, continue to occupy legal systems and scholarship, the 
discursive analytical framework used here may be useful for understanding law’s 
interaction with the complex extra-legal factors which shape such phenomena. Before 
“taking sides” in the political controversy, it is useful to observe how the positions of 
such “sides” are epistemologically shaped, and what brings about our perceptions of the 
problems in question. 
